an analysis of violence requires tracing the edge sideways like a crab scuttling.6 This sideways scuttling may be argued to beset the identification of non-violence as well. While most scholars would classify rational disputation and persuasion as non-violent, arguments have been made that the colonization of consciousness by Western thought constitutes precisely a form of ethnocide (see Bauman, within). At stake is what exactly constitutes the parameters between violence and non-violence.
The problem may be compared to the classical dichotomy between religion and the secular. In his work on Western taxonomies and religion, Russell T. McCutcheon reflects on how religion and the secular are co-dependent categories. He argues, "I suspect that the modern invention of 'belief' and 'practice' and 'the sacred' and 'the secular,' continue to play a central role in regulating that high stakes game that we call modern identity."7 The same co-dependance may be argued to regulate the conceptual distinction between violence and non-violence.
One recent example of these tensions and politics around using the term violence is the media's treatment of the Baltimore protests of April 2015. On April 12, a 25 year-old African American named Freddy Gray was arrested and sustained acute injuries during his police transportation. The injuries sent Gray into a coma; he died on April 18. There was a public outcry against the police officers who handled Gray's arrest, and protests grew to a point that the city declared a state of emergency on April 28. The media framed the public reactions as either riots or protests, with a particular focus on physical attacks on property by the protestors. Some journalists and scholars argued that the media's narrative was mired with racial overtones, and converted organized dissent and protest into the chaotic violence of riots. Here, violence was presented as either a political form of resistance or as insensible and destructive impulses.8
The ambiguity in the media's coverage of the 2015 Baltimore protests shares strong similarities to treatments of the African American student protests during the 1960s. In her examination of African American student protests, Arendt questions the manner in which radical student protests were categorized as part of the same practices as arson and armed revolt.9 Martin Luther King Jr. pressed the same line of inquiry during a speech at a Michigan high school on March 14, 1968.
It is not enough for me to stand before you tonight and condemn riots. It would be morally irresponsible for me to do that without, at the same time, condemning the contingent, intolerable conditions that exist in our society. These conditions are the things that cause individuals to feel that they have no other alternative than to engage in violent rebellions to get attention. And I must say tonight that a riot is the language of the unheard.10
In framing the protests as a form of rebellion and the language of the unheard, King drew attention to the ambiguity in the ways that one may grasp violence. The ambiguity noted by King and Arendt speaks to this issue's six essays and postscript.
First, Tobin Shearer examines this ambiguity in "Striking at the Sacred: The Violence of Prayer, 1960 Prayer, -1969 ." He notes that public prayer, by most accounts a non-violent act of piety, provoked an astonishingly violent response during the Civil Rights marches of the 1960s, and that protesters anticipated some of this response. The specter of kneeling protesters assaulted by taunts (e.g., Memphis 1966) was intended to showcase a moral dichotomy via ritual staging: the kneeling, praying, mostly black protesters assumed the moral high ground against the white segregationists who assaulted them. By the same staging, protesters also strove to elicit recognition of a common (and Christian) humanity with their assailants. This backfired in Cairo (1962) , when a praying girl was run over by a truck. Overall, though, the protesters were not blind to the power of ritual spectacle to engage the ire of their oppressors. Shearer's treatment directly challenges the artificial distinction between violent and non-violent protest by examining the use of the prayer ritual as a catalyst for violence and for the transformation of public consciousness.
6 Taussig, Defacement, 2. 7 McCutcheon, "'They," 191. 8 Reflecting on the discussion of the Baltimore city protests, Craig Martin writes, "That is to say: resistance to resistance is sensible and reasonable until it isn't. In retrospect, resistance to resistance can be portrayed as backwards, conservative, foolish, self-serving, or cowardly." Martin, "On the Demonization." 9 Arendt, On Violence , 91. 10 King Jr., "The Other America."
This tenuous distinction between violence and non-violence is also found in the classifications of religious traditions. Particularly after the U.S. 9/11 attacks, Islamic traditions have been associated with violence. The one exception to this classification is the global reception to Sufi orders, which are actively encouraged and supported by countries like Morocco to counter "violent" traditions. In "Sufism and AntiColonial Violent Resistance Movements: The Qadiriyya and Sanussi Orders in Algeria and Libya," Fait Muedini argues that although governments and the Western media position Sufi orders as apolitical and non-violent, Sufi orders retain a rich history of politicized violence and militant jihad. Turning to the region and historical framework that birthed Frantz Fanon's work, Muedini looks at the Sufi Qadiriyya order's role in the Algerian anti-colonial rebellions and the Sufi Sanussi order's role in the Libyan anti-colonial resistance, revealing the violence inherent in those non-violently framed Sufi orders.
At the time of African American student protests in the U.S., there was a growth of religio-political protests in Vietnam. Protesting the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and its negative impact on Buddhism, Thich Quang Duc set himself on fire on June 11, 1963. Although his act was internationalized, Russell T. McCutcheon notes how the event received "little or no treatment by scholars of religion."11 McCutcheon's reflection underscores yet another religious system that contains nonviolent classifications: Buddhism. John Soboslai looks at the ambiguity of violence in "Violently Peaceful: Tibetan Self-Immolation and the Problem of the Non/Violence Binary." Buddhist scriptures uphold the practice ahiṃsā, a Sanskrit word often translated as non-violence, but Soboslai points out that it is more accurate to translate the term as non-harmful or non-injurious. Here, the Buddhist (as well as Hindu and Jain) concept of violence becomes contingent upon the interpretation of harm. Is a compassionate act -such as giving one's body to a cause in a form of self-immolation -a harmful act? Even though the Buddhist interpretation of violence is more specific, Soboslai highlights the pervasive subjectivity embedded in the classification scheme that delineates harm from non-harm.
John Thompson also challenges the nonviolent depiction of Buddhism in his article, "Ahiṃsā and its Ambiguities: Reading the story of Buddha and Aṅgulimāla." Thompson argues that there is a Buddhist ambivalence toward violence (hiṃsā) in the narrative of a famous disciple of the Buddha, Aṅgulimāla. Although he became awakened (enlightened), Aṅgulimāla slaughtered hundreds of people prior to becoming a monk. In many accounts, Aṅgulimāla believed he needed to kill 1,000 people to reach liberation and had collected 999 fingers -one from each of his victims -before encountering his last victim, the Buddha. The change from his previous aspirations to that of Buddhist monk suggest that the Buddha did more than stop Aṅgulimāla; he also converted him to a new liberation model. Thompson locates a value of violence in the Buddhist notion of impermanence and its repercussions in the face of Buddhist liberation.
In his discussion of "The Violence of Conversion: Proselytization and Interreligious Controversy in the Work of Swami Dayananda Saraswati," Chad Bauman examines the slippery notion of violent thought. Christian proselytizers in India long have stood accused of "allurement" through material support of the poor and through structural advantage based on access to Western privileges. But Swami Dayananda Saraswati condemns proselytizers for something more profound: ethnocide. The argument is based on the notion of a pristine "innermost" person, who is under attack by proselytizers, against whom legal penalties should apply. To Bauman, presumptions riddle this condemnation. For instance, the notion that religious identity should be protected from the "colonization of consciousness"12 presumes an artificial stasis of personhood and religious imagination, as if these were not constantly shifting in response to myriad influences. Further, why should one's religious perspectives be more protected than, say, one's political or scientific perspectives? These too obviously respond to changing circumstances and yet the sources for changes are not judged criminal. This is not to mention the additional problem of the contested distinction between violence by persuasion and violence by physical force. Bauman shows that the notions of violence, non-violence, religion and culture all may be disputed.
Lastly, in "The Violence of Non-Violence in the Revelation of John," Pieter de Villiers takes on the classical interpretation of Revelation as a non-violent book. He holds up the promised paradisical end time, when all wrongs will be righted and the wicked will be subdued, against the lethal violence and indeed the delight in it anticipated to occur on the way to that end time. Because of its exhortation to passive martyrdom, Christian witnessing, and a spiritualized vision of end times, Revelation traditionally is held to align with non-violent Christian teachings. Yet de Villiers points to the violent subtext in the gruesome rhetoric of divine warfare. In its language of exclusion, its gendering of good and evil, and above all in its language of holy war, the book has shaped Christian imagination profoundly, to the extent of spurring contempt for non-Christians and implicitly sanctioning violence against them. De Villiers's argument rests on the powerful role of rhetoric in shaping imagination, specifically the imagination of the deity as a swordwielding super-male gleefully bent on destroying enemies, who tend to be rendered as either monstrous or female. The essay speaks to the intricate web of violent and non-violent innuendoes in Christian discourse.
In sum, all of the articles in this issue of Open Theology challenge, to one degree or another, the superficial distinction between violence and non-violence in modern parlance. We hope that by presenting them together, the articles will stir discourse on both terms as they relate to religious movements and categories of thought.
